[address-policy-wg] 2008-08 (Initial Certification Policy in the RIPE NCC Service Region) going to Last Call
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Martin Millnert
millnert at gmail.com
Thu May 5 11:11:33 CEST 2011
Alex, On Thu, May 5, 2011 at 4:19 AM, Alex Band <alexb at ripe.net> wrote: > In a nutshell: My take is that Resource Certification drives routing *preferences*. If a network operator sees an expired or invalid prefix, they can investigate and *choose* to take action. This also applies to decisions when using router hardware, as described in section 5 of "BGP Prefix Origin Validation": > http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-sidr-pfx-validate-01#section-5 > > "Considering invalid routes for BGP decision process is a pure ***local policy matter*** and should be done with utmost care." (Emphasis mine) I am hoping you can give some practical examples on how one goes about considering routes invalid with utmost care. Kind Regards, Martin
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