[anti-abuse-wg] 2019-03 New Policy Proposal (BGP Hijacking is a RIPE Policy Violation)
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Carlos Friaças
cfriacas at fccn.pt
Fri Mar 22 13:46:42 CET 2019
On Fri, 22 Mar 2019, Sascha Luck [ml] wrote: > On Fri, Mar 22, 2019 at 12:21:43PM +0100, JORDI PALET MARTINEZ via > anti-abuse-wg wrote: >> I don't think I've said that if it is really a victim. I know my English is >> bad, but not so terrible! > > not you, that was Carlos and he has since clarified what he > meant. > >> A direct peer I mean here is the provider of the hijacker. Should you >> verify and filter anything that doesn't belong to your customer? > > I do because my customers are small-ish and mostly personally > known to me and I can use manual prefix filters. I don't want > to presume as to what is possible or scalable for other networks, nor even > what they should do. Please let me add this: Someone filing a report must identify the source of an hijack. Sometimes hijackers "simulate" customers, to be able to shake-off any queries. If you can prove you and "your customer" are not the one and the same party, the consequence should be zero, because you as a transit provider are also being a victim. And here i would explicitely exclude any "warnings". 3rd parties can't be minimially liable for others' wrongdoings -- and currently to some people, hijacking is not even part of "wrongdoings". Regards, Carlos > rgds, > SL > >
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