[routing-wg] Bogon ASN Filter Policy
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Alexander Azimov
aa at qrator.net
Wed Jun 15 16:13:04 CEST 2016
Dear colleagues, I've made small observation to check existence of alternative paths - from more then 8k prefixes, that are announced by private ASNs, only 2k of them have alternative with not-private origin. So I waive from my suggestion, it's not going to work. Thank you all for comments! 2016-06-15 16:16 GMT+03:00 Sebastian Becker <sb at lab.dtag.de>: > > > Am 14.06.2016 um 20:43 schrieb Gert Doering <gert at space.net>: > > > > Hi, > > > > On Tue, Jun 14, 2016 at 04:51:40PM +0300, Alexander Azimov wrote: > >> But I have security consideration that filtering isn't a proper > mechanism > >> to reach this goal. Imagine next situation - if transit accidently > prepends > >> its paths with private AS number it will result in DoS for all stub > >> networks connected to this transit. > > > > This is good. A transit ISP stupid enough to make such mistakes need > > to pay in blood and money. > > +1 > > -- > Sebastian Becker > sb at lab.dtag.de > > -- | Alexander Azimov | HLL l QRATOR | tel.: +7 499 241 81 92 | mob.: +7 915 360 08 86 | skype: mitradir | mailto: aa at qrator.net | visit: www.qrator.net -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: <https://lists.ripe.net/ripe/mail/archives/routing-wg/attachments/20160615/7f2bb00c/attachment.html>
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