<html><body><div style="color:#000; background-color:#fff; font-family:Helvetica Neue-Light, Helvetica Neue Light, Helvetica Neue, Helvetica, Arial, Lucida Grande, Sans-Serif;font-size:16px"><div id="yui_3_16_0_1_1430668032630_66902"><span>Hi Pierre</span></div><div id="yui_3_16_0_1_1430668032630_66924"><br><span></span></div><div id="yui_3_16_0_1_1430668032630_66954"><span id="yui_3_16_0_1_1430668032630_66955">I would like to just clarify a few points in your email.</span></div><div id="yui_3_16_0_1_1430668032630_66994"><br><span id="yui_3_16_0_1_1430668032630_66955"></span></div><div dir="ltr" id="yui_3_16_0_1_1430668032630_67009"><span id="yui_3_16_0_1_1430668032630_66955">Firstly the article you referred to was published in November 2011. At that time your could query for a MNTNER object and the MD5 hash was returned. Although there was no file available on the FTP site with a list of all MNTNER objects, as you know it was possible to download all the other bulk object files and create a list of all referenced MNTNER objects. There was no limit on how many of these that could be queried so it was not difficult to get a list of all MD5 hashes.<br></span></div><div id="yui_3_16_0_1_1430668032630_67103"><br><span id="yui_3_16_0_1_1430668032630_66955"></span></div><div id="yui_3_16_0_1_1430668032630_67109"><span id="yui_3_16_0_1_1430668032630_66955">Two days later, in November 2011, another article was published outlining the process of hiding the MD5 hashes</span></div><div dir="ltr" id="yui_3_16_0_1_1430668032630_67113"><span id="yui_3_16_0_1_1430668032630_66955"><a id="yui_3_16_0_1_1430668032630_67112" href="https://labs.ripe.net/Members/denis/securing-md5-hashes-in-the-ripe-database">https://labs.ripe.net/Members/denis/securing-md5-hashes-in-the-ripe-database</a></span></div><div id="yui_3_16_0_1_1430668032630_67148" dir="ltr"><span id="yui_3_16_0_1_1430668032630_66955"><br></span></div><div id="yui_3_16_0_1_1430668032630_67150" dir="ltr"><span id="yui_3_16_0_1_1430668032630_66955">This was accepted by the community and it was implemented in January 2012</span></div><div id="yui_3_16_0_1_1430668032630_67409" dir="ltr"><span id="yui_3_16_0_1_1430668032630_66955"><a id="yui_3_16_0_1_1430668032630_67416" href="https://www.ripe.net/ripe/mail/archives/db-wg/2012-January/003856.html">https://www.ripe.net/ripe/mail/archives/db-wg/2012-January/003856.html</a></span></div><div id="yui_3_16_0_1_1430668032630_67438" dir="ltr"><span id="yui_3_16_0_1_1430668032630_66955"><br></span></div><div id="yui_3_16_0_1_1430668032630_67408" dir="ltr"><span id="yui_3_16_0_1_1430668032630_66955"> Since then it has not been possible to query for a MNTNER and receive the MD5 hash.</span></div><div id="yui_3_16_0_1_1430668032630_67291" dir="ltr"><br><span id="yui_3_16_0_1_1430668032630_66955"></span></div><div id="yui_3_16_0_1_1430668032630_67292" dir="ltr"><span style="" class="" id="yui_3_16_0_1_1430668032630_66955">In this second article, and again in the announcement to the DB WG, it stated "</span>The RIPE NCC will then contact all the maintainers of MNTNER objects
containing passwords and ask them to change these for new, strong
passwords." As far as I remember all MNTNER holders with MD5 passwords were contacted and advised to change them.</div><div id="yui_3_16_0_1_1430668032630_67623" dir="ltr"><br></div><div id="yui_3_16_0_1_1430668032630_67624" dir="ltr">cheers</div><div id="yui_3_16_0_1_1430668032630_67625" dir="ltr">Denis Walker</div><div id="yui_3_16_0_1_1430668032630_67721" dir="ltr">Independent Netizen<br></div><div id="yui_3_16_0_1_1430668032630_67485" dir="ltr"><br></div><br> <div id="yui_3_16_0_1_1430668032630_66895" style="font-family: Helvetica Neue-Light, Helvetica Neue Light, Helvetica Neue, Helvetica, Arial, Lucida Grande, Sans-Serif; font-size: 16px;"> <div id="yui_3_16_0_1_1430668032630_66894" style="font-family: HelveticaNeue, Helvetica Neue, Helvetica, Arial, Lucida Grande, Sans-Serif; font-size: 16px;"> <div id="yui_3_16_0_1_1430668032630_66893" dir="ltr"> <hr id="yui_3_16_0_1_1430668032630_66979" size="1"> <font id="yui_3_16_0_1_1430668032630_66917" face="Arial" size="2"> <b><span style="font-weight:bold;">From:</span></b> Pierre Kim <pierre.kim.sec@gmail.com><br> <b><span style="font-weight: bold;">To:</span></b> db-wg@ripe.net <br> <b><span style="font-weight: bold;">Sent:</span></b> Monday, 4 May 2015, 22:12<br> <b><span style="font-weight: bold;">Subject:</span></b> [db-wg] MD5s of the RIPE database, Deprecation of MD5 and safe authentication methods<br> </font> </div> <div id="yui_3_16_0_1_1430668032630_66918" class="y_msg_container"><br>Dear Database Working Group Members,<br><br>I am contacting you to share the thoughts on the usage of MD5 in the<br>RIPE database. I already discussed the problems concerning MD5<br>authentication with RIPE NCC Security<<a id="yui_3_16_0_1_1430668032630_66956" ymailto="mailto:security@ripe.net" href="mailto:security@ripe.net">security@ripe.net</a>> on 2 Apr 2015<br>and RIPE NCC Security officer encouraged me to contact your group to<br>work together on this issue.<br><br>In 2011, I had grabbed all the MD5s of the RIPE database before<br>they were taken out from the public view and I don't think I was the<br>only security researcher who downloaded all the hashes.<br><br>This john-compatible file (containing MNT logins and MD5 hashs) was<br>never exposed to public but the hashs can be (VERY) easily<br>cracked. From the discussion with RIPE Security (who received a copy<br>of this file), 27.000 usable hashes (on a total of 36.000) appeared to<br>be valid til now.<br><br>By reading <a id="yui_3_16_0_1_1430668032630_67024" href="https://labs.ripe.net/Members/kranjbar/password-management-in-ripe-database" target="_blank">https://labs.ripe.net/Members/kranjbar/password-management-in-ripe-database</a><br>, I see : "The MD5 hash is public, when running a single query (not<br>for bulk queries)."<br>I assume this was a known problem but the RIPE didn't alert that all<br>the hashs have been retrieved, although there were some urgency to<br>change the passwords or to use a safer authentication method.<br><br>When I discussed it with RIPE NCC Security, I gave a 90 day disclosure<br>policy about this "public" information, starting from the 16 Apr 2015.<br>The 90 day period can be adjusted by adding more days at the end if<br>RIPE shows a good progress of the migration. I wanted to do<br>responsible disclosure when I saw the RIPE Responsible Disclosure<br>Policy which is a Really Good Thing, I think.<br><br>According to the RIPE transparency, as recommended by RIPE NCC<br>Security, therefore I am now contacting this working group to work<br>together because deprecation of MD5 is an important change in the RIPE<br>database and it must be debated in a democratic manner.<br><br>My analysis is simple: The MD5 authentication is broken for years and<br>it's time to change to a more secure method. I think people needs to<br>be encouraged to move to SSO authentication. Using MD5 now is unsafe<br>and dangerous, especially with unchanged 4 year-old passwords.<br><br>Please share your thoughts about this situation. I will be happy to<br>debate with you.<br><br><br>I want to thank Ivo Dijkhuis, RIPE NCC Information Security Officer,<br>for the quality of the exchanges we had.<br><br>Regards,<br><br>--<br>Pierre Kim<br><a ymailto="mailto:pierre.kim.sec@gmail.com" href="mailto:pierre.kim.sec@gmail.com">pierre.kim.sec@gmail.com</a><br>@PierreKimSec<br><a href="https://pierrekim.github.io/" target="_blank">https://pierrekim.github.io/</a><br><br><br><br></div> </div> </div> </div></body></html>